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Towards a Theory of Informal Supply Networks:
An Exploratory Case Study of the Za’atari Refugee Camp
Abstract
Studies of humanitarian supply chain operations contribute to efficient system designs for the
delivery of goods and services to disaster- and conflict-stricken regions. However, our
understanding of what happens to these relief goods and services after they are delivered is quite
limited. Using a case study of the Za’atari refugee camp in Jordan, we develop a theory of
informal supply networks, whereby we uncover how refugee-led, informal supply networks
emerge in the camp. We find that these supply networks are an aggregate of predominantly illicit
—yet legitimate—channels and social relationships that support the economic exchange of goods
and services between distinct actors or actor groups. We not only identify the cultural
conventions and behavioral codes that govern ties between refugees—and between refugees and
relief-related actors—but also define how these networks are configured. Considering these
findings, we contend that the informal economic activities emanating from the refugee camp
benefit the host community and enhance the resilience of the informal supply networks. As
informal economic activities also improve the quality of life in the camp, camp authorities and
host country governments should attend to informal activities as they create rules and policies for
refugee resettlement.

Key words: humanitarian relief operations, disaster science, informal supply networks, informal
economies, network resilience, refugee camp, UNHCR, case study, Syrian refugee, Za’atari
refugee camp
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1. Introduction
Due to an escalating Syrian Civil War in 2011, refugee-related challenges quickly
ascended to the top of the global political agenda. Today, there are approximately 65 million
people who have been uprooted from their homes, more than any other time since World War II.
Nearly a third of these have no alternative but to seek dangerous border crossings, and many of
these find their way to sites where relief systems, such as refugee camps, are being deployed.
However, integration challenges, unwillingness to support refugee populations, and rising
nationalistic tendencies exist in many parts of the world (Collier & Betts, 2017a). These realities
prompt the study of humanitarian relief operations that support the successful integration of
refugees into host communities.
Humanitarian relief operations increasingly represent a critical and timely area of
research with a growing number of scholars focusing on logistics and tactical challenges of
matching supply and demand in various disaster relief settings. We answer a call to examine
system-level challenges (Pedraza-Martinez & Wassenhove, 2016) that drive the causes and
socioeconomic consequences of crises, as well as how these consequences are confronted over
time. Tackling challenges, such as temporary, post-conflict refugee settlement, requires a deep
understanding of human behavior among the various actor groups engaged in disaster-related
settings (Drabek, 1986; Quarantelli, 1966).
We examine humanitarian relief operations in a Syrian refugee camp. Refugee camps
represent complex social systems (Algier, 2002) that have important political, social, and
economic consequences for host countries (Dunn, 2018). While there is an understanding of how
4

goods are delivered to such disaster-stricken zones, there is little known about how humanitarian
relief operations function inside refugee camps and how interactions develop among relief
organizations, refugees, host communities and governments. We contend that scholarship in
humanitarian relief operations should move beyond the study of optimizing supply chains for the
delivery of crucial goods and services to supporting the quality of life of refugees through
operations management.
While humanitarian relief operations inside refugee camps invariably involve refugees,
the development patterns of refugee camps can vary as a result of the economic and social
backgrounds of the refugees, as well as the connections (or lack thereof) of refugee groups with
host communities (Alloush, Taylor, Gupta, Valdes, & Gonzalez-Estrada, 2017; Arar, 2017;
Kreibaum, 2016; Taylor et al., 2016; UNDP, 2015). Recent research has highlighted an inherent
tension between the humanitarian principle of providing for the basic needs of a vulnerable
population—by intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), such as the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR or UN Refugee Agency) and the World Food Program
(WFP), as well as non-governmental organizations (NGOs) contracted by IGOs—and the
evolving economic and social development needs of refugees (Barnett, 2014). With increasingly
longer stays becoming the norm (Collier & Betts, 2017a,b; Loescher, 2017), host governments
and communities often view refugees according to a real—or manipulated—fear of having to
permanently support refugees in their communities (Anderson, 2013). Concerns about the
economic, social, and political impact of refugees have often led to reluctant welcomes and a
lack of integration in regional economies and labor forces. Prior research has also revealed that
relief operations championed by the UNHCR are outdated and fail to account for recent, large5

scale migration patterns of refugees throughout Europe and Asia (De Montclos & Kagwanja,
2000; Pedraza-Martinez & Wassenhove, 2016).
Since refugees are first uprooted and then confined to a foreign locale, refugee camps
become settings where former social relations and norms are either fractured or temporarily
suspended. However, camps—as physical locales—are not a social vacuum but rather spaces
where refugees strive to engage in familiar cultural and economic practices. Such practices
impact not only how the daily routines of life are experienced but also how economic stability is
realized in the camp. When viewed as a system, these activities represent the types of operations
undertaken by relief-related actors in refugee camps. The role that refugees play in shaping these
operations represents an underexplored yet important area of research. Refugee camps should not
only be viewed as a more or less permanent form of settlement within set physical and social
boundaries but also places where refugees have agency to create their futures through economic
exchange. Thus, we investigate how the economic activities of refugees shape the humanitarian
relief operations inside a refugee camp.
As the current Syrian refugee crisis presents a rare opportunity for this type of research,
we conducted a case study of the Za’atari refugee camp—the largest refugee camp in Jordan—
from the time of its establishment to its current form. Leveraging data collected in interviews
(i.e., with focal camp stakeholders), from archival sources, and through direct field observations,
we propose a theory of informal supply networks based on the activities of refugees and reliefrelated actors.

6

2. Literature
2.1 The global refugee regime
Sudden and large refugee resettlement continues to be one of the most challenging
humanitarian crises of the last decade (Jones, 2016). In response to large numbers of refugees
fleeing Europe during World War II, the modern system of accounting for refugees emerged in
the late 1940s and led to the creation of the Office of the UNHCR. The 1951 Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees—or the 1951 Refugee Convention—committed governments
to provide protection and basic rights to people fleeing persecution in their home territories
(Loescher, 2017; UNHCR, 2018a). The current global refugee regime and international
humanitarian order represent the institutional structures that define boundaries of movement and
the status of refugees, as well as the authority and responsibility of IGOs, NGOs, host
governments, and communities (Agier, 2011; Collier & Betts, 2017a; Sanyal, 2012).
As part of their function to represent an intergovernmental network, the UNHCR takes an
emergency-oriented humanitarian approach in guiding refugees to a protected and safe—albeit
temporary—place (Jahre et al., 2016). Therefore, the focal mission of the UNHCR is to provide
refugees with critical emergency assistance, including clean water, food, shelter, sanitation
services, basic medical care, and common consumable goods. In other words, the UNHCR
supports short-term alleviation of suffering. In the founding statute (1950) of the UNHCR,
refugee camps were set up as non-political entities that allowed the UNHCR to access refugees
in areas of conflict and to provide sanctuary for both victims and aid workers.
More recently, refugee camps have also been set up to buffer citizens from refugees, with
refugees kept at a physical—and symbolic—distance from the host community (Agier, 2011;
7

Collier & Betts, 2017b; Dunn, 2018). By keeping refugees inside the camp, host governments
assume that refugees—after a temporarily stay in the camp—will eventually return to their
homelands. In reality, over half of these refugees endure protracted stays of more than two
decades, and over 80 percent of camp refugees remain there for at least five years (UNHCR,
2018b,c; UNRWA, 2018). Outside the camp, freedom of movement is either prohibited or—at
best—tightly controlled, and access to education and employment is highly constrained. Overall,
there is little investment in the economic and social development needs of refugees
(Kleinschmidt & Sy, 2016). As a result, refugees remain in an in-between state due to imposed
limitations that affect their access to an economic livelihood and to the social services afforded to
the host community.
2.2 The informal economy and the refugee economy
The informal economy is defined as “the set of illegal yet legitimate activities through
which actors [can] recognize and exploit opportunities” (Webb, Khoury, & Hitt, 2020, p. 492).
Along a continuum of informality (Williams & Shahid, 2016), context (i.e., the cultural or legal
frameworks of a locality) determines whether illicit, informal activities are accepted as
legitimate, such as selling counterfeit shoes, or illegitimate, such as selling weapons (Webb,
Tihanyi, Ireland, & Sirmon, 2009).
Individuals participate in the informal economy when other options are unavailable
(Fadahunsi & Rosa, 2002) or when market access is not served by formal routes (Holt &
Littlewood, 2014). The tolerance for—and subsequent development of—the informal economy
may also reflect traditions and customs that govern how transactions have been carried out in a
particular context over time (Webb et al., 2020; Wilson, 2018). For example, the informal
8

economy is especially prevalent in contexts that have placed a greater emphasis on intermediary
roles within markets (Fadahunsi & Rosa, 2002). Although hardly optimal in terms of operational
efficiency, these roles do overcome obstacles imposed by security apparatuses (Khoury &
Prasad, 2016). The skills for this mode of market engagement, such as taking on an intermediary
role, may be embedded within cultural norms (Webb et al., 2020).
An informal economy provides camp refugees with a livelihood when a formal economy
is unavailable. In such a contained population, the informal economy is characterized by
restricted mobility and restricted participation in markets outside the designated boundaries of
the camp (Khoury & Prasad, 2016; Werker, 2007). At the same time, the informal economy is
structured as an institutional space where state and international regulations intersect. Exchanges
that occur in this space can be evaluated along a continuum of enterprise informality (i.e.,
according to subjective degrees of legality or illicitness) where the legitimacy of informal
exchange activities is contextually-defined (Webb et al., 2020). In the context of a refugee camp,
refugees experience both opportunities and constraints (Oka, 2011), and relief organizations
tolerate varying rules between those applied inside the camp and those held by host community.
Since the institutional contexts of refugee camps can vary substantially, there is no one
typical refugee economy. For example, Syrian refugee camps in Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey
vary in how they are managed because the host countries have different geo-political goals,
capabilities, resources, and ethnic connections with the refugees (Chatty, 2016). Likewise, some
refugee camps, such as those for Palestinian refugees throughout Lebanon or Gaza, evolve into
urban neighborhoods that have little prospect for formal economic opportunities. Ultimately,
these ghettoized camps have endured seven decades of abysmal funding and neglect (Shepherd,
9

Saade, & Wincent, 2020). Despite these differences, researchers have recognized that refugee
economies do not exist in isolation but are rather tied to market actors and entities in the host
community and—at times—those located abroad (Betts, Omata, & Bloom, 2017; Chowdhury,
2020; Turner, 2005; UNHCR, 2017). While refugees are lured by economic opportunities beyond
camp borders due to their dire situation, they are also subject to a complex management system
inside the camp that affords authority to IGOs, NGOs, and local governments. This type of
context raises the question of how informal economies emerge and take shape within and beyond
refugee camps.
2.3 Disaster science and humanitarian relief operations
Rooted in sociology, the study of disaster science appeared in the U.S. in the late 1950s,
when social scientists—with the support from military organizations—investigated how extreme
stress impacted the social and psychological aspects of behavior, as well as how governments
protected populations and effectively managed crises (Quarantelli, 1966). While early disaster
science research had a clear focus on war-related disasters, many practical field studies were
conducted in peacetime. These studies examined social behaviors during sudden natural disasters
and extrapolated earlier learnings. Over more than 60 years, Quarantelli (1966) and other
pioneers in disaster science research found that disasters brought out the best in humanity. Time
and time again, disaster victims formed emergent organizations and had a heightened sense of
kinship and camaraderie (Drabek, 1986; Rodríguez, Trainor, & Quarantelli, 2006).
Since the 1980s, disaster science research has expanded to include slow-onset and
chronic disasters, and it has shifted its focus from disaster planning to disaster management
(Holguín-Veras, Jaller, Van Wassenhove, Pérez, & Wachtendorf, 2012b; Quarantelli, 2005).
10

Researchers have also highlighted the role of social capital in relief networks and stakeholder
connections (Adger et al., 2005; Dynes, 2005; Nakagawa & Shaw, 2004; Tatsuki, 2008).
Following Lin (2008, p. 51), social capital is defined as “resources embedded in one’s social
networks, [and] resources that can be accessed or mobilized through ties in the networks.”
Disaster science scholars associate social capital with three forms of relationship ties—bonding,
bridging, and linking. These ties structure the relief network, which, in turn, connects disaster
victims to different donors and resources (Aldrich, 2011; Prost, 2006).
In the absence of social capital, certain groups, such as isolated groups and newcomers to
existing networks, can be excluded. Holguín-Veras, Jaller, & Wachtendorf (2012a) examined
humanitarian logistics structures to assess the effectiveness of resource deployment. They
specified three types of logistics structures based on an in-depth analysis of humanitarian relief
operations during the Haiti earthquake. During the relief effort, these logistics structures differed
in terms of the level of integration between local social networks and external and internal relief
organizations. These studies emphasize the importance of understanding relief supply networks
and social networks that span across disaster zones.
In the last two decades, increasing natural and climate-related disasters—and their related
disruptions—have drawn operations management scholars to investigate humanitarian relief
operations (Pedraza-Martinez & Wassenhove, 2016; Sanyal, 2012; Starr & Van Wassenhove,
2014; UNHCR, 2009; UNHCR, 2017). One research agenda has focused on logistics and
inventory solutions in disaster environments, which are often characterized by severe resource
and time constraints, as well as information uncertainty. Gupta, Starr, Farahani, & Matinrad
(2016) argued that even though humanitarian relief operations account for both disaster response
11

and program development most research studies focus on response, overlooking recovery,
restoration, and development. Pedraza-Martinez & Wassenhove (2016) also called for future
studies that would attend to the complexities of managing an operational mix of response and
development. One exception is Sodhi (2016), who explored disaster cycles in terms of the
interplay between long-term development and short-term response.
After taking stock of recent studies in disaster science and humanitarian relief operations,
we argue that investigating relief operations inside refugee camps is an important step in
advancing a development-oriented research agenda. In refugee camps, the formal relief
operations of IGOs/NGOs and host governments interact with the informal economic activities
of refugees to build social-technical camp systems. Using an exploratory case study approach,
we investigate how the economic activities of refugees enable operations, such as production and
distribution, and build refugee economies in a refugee camp.
3. Method
3.1 Research context and design
Consistent with our core research question and assumptions, we employed an inductive
research design (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Miles & Huberman, 1994). Our choice of the Za’atari
refugee camp was informed by previous single case studies on organizational networks (e.g.,
Browning, Beyer, & Shetler, 1995; Obstfeld, 2005) and supply network research (e.g., Wu &
Pullman, 2015). Theoretical sampling depends upon the selection of a case that is either
unusually revelatory or an extreme exemplar (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007; Yin, 1994). Thus,
we chose the Za’atari refugee camp as it is the second largest in the world, after the Dadaab
Refugee Camp in Kenya (UNHCR, 2018b), and since it has various commonalities with—and
12

distinctions from—other camps around the world. It is often profiled as a “success story” in the
media and by relief organizations and donor countries, given its city-like settings and energetic
marketplaces.
During the early years of the Syrian conflict, the lead author—a native of the region—
was located in Jordan, and the author team was positioned to secure research access to the camp
through university and NGO relationships. The author team followed recommended guidelines
regarding researcher (team) position and reflexivity with the focal subject and setting (Berger,
2015). Since the camp only included Syrian refugees, the author team was able to conduct the
study with a sensitivity to the lives of these refugees—both prior to and following a forced
migration to Jordan (Mackenzie, McDowell, & Pittaway, 2007). For example, the lead author—
native in Levantine Arabic1—had traveled to various border regions of Syria over the years prior
to the conflict. Further, the lead author and another member of the author team were children of
Palestinian refugees, growing up with a sensitivity to conflict-induced refugee narratives and
experiencing direct socialization within communities of recent and former refugees. These
advantages in language skills and personal experiences provided valuable perspectives when
conducting interviews, capturing nuanced artifacts, and recognizing meaningful observations
(Berger, 2015; Temple & Edwards, 2002). Further, these attributes created a sense of
approachability during interviews.
3.2 Data collection
Qualitative interview data were collected between January 2016 and September 2018, in
addition to secondary data collected from 2012 to 2018. Data were collected from refugees in the

1

Levantine Arabic is used throughout Syria and Jordan, as well as in Lebanon and Palestine.
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camp, residents of the host city of Al-Mafraq (henceforth, Mafraq), managers and staff members
of IGOs/NGOs, and officials of the Jordanian government. As these groups represent the crucial
actor groups in this emergency setting (Quarantelli, 1966), they are positioned in terms of their
respective roles in the supply networks, policy making, and camp management.
Accessing the refugee camp and interviewing refugees often required improvised
planning and flexibility. The approval process had strict procedures concerning who entered,
when they entered, and how long they stayed in the camp. Based on a formal relationship created
between the university of the lead author and the authorities at the camp (i.e., the local
government and the UNHCR), as well as a working relationship of the third author with a
prominent NGO actively working in social services support in the camp, access permits were
granted on five occasions. The first field visit was granted through the UNHCR, while the
remaining visits were enabled through an NGO. Following an entry request, notification of entry
approval came suddenly and often unexpectedly the day prior. Since the lead author was
stationed in Amman, Jordan—located 71 kilometers away from the camp, short-notice field visits
were, however, achievable.
Each field visit lasted between seven and nine hours and involved stops at refugee-owned
shops (e.g., offering food, basic goods, cell phones, perfume, clothing, and wedding gown
rentals), camp-sanctioned supermarkets (e.g., Safeway and Tazweed), and NGO-established
community centers. In addition to refugee camp visits, the lead author also spent two days in the
host community of Mafraq, located ten kilometers from the camp. Finally, the lead author also
participated in various refugee forums (e.g., symposiums, lectures, and events) in Amman during
this time. Forum participants included the Jordanian government, more than 20 NGOs, and
14

several IGOs. These events provided additional information on the interactions of these actors, as
well as their activities in the camp, and the progress of their programs. Trips to the camp and host
community involved direct observations, interviews, and participation in the daily activities of
government security personnel, relief workers, NGOs/IGOs, and refugees.
Levantine Arabic was used for 85% of the interviews conducted in Jordan and English for
all others. Different interview protocols were created for the various interviewee groups, and
interview questions were open-ended to allow interviewees to describe processes and
experiences according to their perceptions. Early interview data was translated, transcribed, and
analyzed to uncover emerging, salient themes, as well as inform the selection of subsequent
interview subjects or the collection of further archival data. The interview questionnaires were
updated as the author team coded these data and new questions arose (see Appendix A for the
interview protocol and a sample of the interview questions).
Interviewing potentially vulnerable subjects, such as refugees, who have escaped
situations of crisis, disaster, or conflict, raises two critical issues (Pacheco-Vega & Parizeau,
2018). First and foremost, the safety of interviewees could not be compromised by the author
team. Thus, the identities of interviewees were protected by the author team through the strict
control and storage of these data on password-encrypted drives and through the anonymization
of all subjects. During and following interviews, subjects also knew that they could retract
information or completely withdraw from the study at any time. Second, the ethnic, lingual, and
social backgrounds of the author team supported a sensitivity to cultural nuances during the
interviews, which—to our knowledge—did not invoke previous experiences of loss and trauma
(Mackenzie et al., 2007). The backgrounds of the authors also helped the team to avoid viewing
15

the context and subjects of the Levantine Middle Eastern culture through a Western lens (Said,
1978). While refugees were the focal actors in the study, their status was not objectified, and
stigmas commonly associated with refugee narratives were not reproduced.
Interviews with NGO/IGO, Jordanian government officials and host community residents
were usually organized directly with the interview subjects; however, interviews with refugees
were coordinated through the NGO managers. Prior to the camp visits, NGO personnel helped
select interviewees and arrange interview times. Snowball sampling—an approach often used in
network-oriented studies (Prell, 2012)—created opportunities to meet with further interviewees,
such as informal refugee retailers or residents of certain camp districts. While such interviews
were unplanned, they helped clarify and triangulate information derived from other interviews,
thus providing a richer understanding of the relationships among refugees and between refugees
and other entities. A large number of interviews were sought to ensure theoretical saturation
(Eisenhardt, 1989) and account for a variety of actor backgrounds. Following our data analysis,
we also consulted various journalist accounts of the camp and the ethnographic dissertation of
Dalal (2014, 2015), which helped triangulate several descriptive and contextual elements
uncovered in the interviews and the observation data.
Interviews provided the most crucial and evidential data for this study. A total of 52 semistructured interviews (i.e., 44 in Levantine Arabic and eight in English) were conducted, with
approximately 95% undertaken by the lead author. In addition to 31 interviews conducted inside
the camp, a further 14 were conducted in Amman, six in the city of Mafraq, and two in
Kathmandu, Nepal.2 One interview with a former UNHCR official, who was in charge of the
2 The

interviews in Nepal were conducted in English with two NGO workers from the Za’atari refugee camp who
were in Nepal for workshop training with one of the authors in February 2018.
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camp in its early years, was conducted over Skype with the author team. Interviews in the camp
took place in settings considered safe by the refugees, such as in a facility or structure affiliated
with an IGO/NGO and, in some instances, in marketplace shops and caravans where the refugees
lived. During two of these visits, the lead author was accompanied by a graduate research
assistant who helped take interview and field notes. Consent to digitally record the interviews
was received from 30 of the 52 interviewees. When taping was not permitted, detailed notes were
taken during and shortly after the interview. Field notes were also taken during all camp visits.
All interviews conducted in Arabic were translated into English within five days of the interview.
The author team also conducted online calls within three days of a field visit to discuss and
further expand a retrospective account of the visit and the interviews. Table 1 lists the
interviewees, the interviewee backgrounds, and the interview sites, durations, and languages.
During the camp visits when interviews were conducted, observation data and field notes
were also collected. Further, approximately 200 photographs and 20 videos were collected
during walks and drives through various camp districts to document the physical infrastructure of
the camp and the routine activities of the refugees. The field visits to the camp and host
community also revealed how the supply network was impacted by the context.
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Table 1
Interview summary.
Interviewee

Interviewee Background

Interview Site, Duration
(in minutes), and Language

Mafraq host community

Bike shop owner
Kiosk owner
Supermarket cashier
Mafraq-based university student

Mafraq, 50, Arabic
Mafraq, 40, Arabic
Mafraq, 45, Arabic
Mafraq, 45, Arabic

Government

Camp community police officer #1
Camp community police officer #2*
Government liaison officer with IGOs
Government liaison officer with NGOs
Government official #1, Ministry of Interior
Government official #2, Ministry of Interior
Country coordinator of NGOs
Camp court lawyer

Za’atari refugee camp, 40, Arabic
Za’atari refugee camp, 50, Arabic
Amman, 50, Arabic
Amman, 45, Arabic
Amman, 55, Arabic
Amman, 35, Arabic
Amman, 50, English
Za’atari refugee camp, 45, Arabic

NGO/IGO

Camp field worker, NGO-A
Camp field worker, UNHCR
Camp site supervisor, NGO-C
Child protection officer #1, NGO-B
Child protection officer #2, NGO-B
Camp operations driver, NGO-A
Camp former director #1
Camp former director #2
Government liaison officer, NGO-C
Head of media relations, NGO-D*
Livelihood unit officer, UNHCR*
Logistics manager, NGO-B
Logistics officer, NGO-B
Policy officer, UNHCR
Program officer, NGO-A*
Relief Worker, NGO-D
Purchasing officer, UNHCR
Regional supply coordinator, UNHCR*
Retail supervisor, WFP
Store manager, Safeway**
Supply chain coordinator, WFP
Supply chain officer, UNHCR

Za’atari refugee camp, 35, Arabic
Za’atari refugee camp, 40, Arabic
Za’atari refugee camp, 40, Arabic
Amman, 90, English
Amman, 70, Arabic
Za’atari refugee camp, 35, Arabic
Amman, 45, English
Teleconference call, 100, English
Amman, 45, Arabic
Amman, 60, English
Amman, 35, Arabic
Amman, 35, Arabic
Za’atari refugee camp, 35, Arabic
Amman, 45, Arabic
Za’atari refugee camp, 35, Arabic
Amman, 45, Arabic
Amman, 65, Arabic
Amman, 55, English
Za’atari refugee camp, 35, Arabic
Za’atari refugee camp, 40, Arabic
Amman, 35, English
Za’atari refugee camp, 65, English

Refugee

Community leader #1
Community leader #2
Dairy products seller
Unemployed refugee
Elderly Bedouin refugees (wife* and husband)
Legal wholesaler employee
Farmer living in a Bedouin district.
Grocery retailer
Grocery wholesaler and retailer
Temporary worker at community center, NGO-A
Bedouin refugee
Mobile phone shop owner
Perfume shop owner
Restaurant owner
Street sweeper
University student refugee
Community center teacher (former lawyer in Syria)*
Teenage hairdressing assistant

Za’atari refugee camp, 35, Arabic
Za’atari refugee camp, 35, Arabic
Za’atari refugee camp, 40, Arabic
Za’atari refugee camp, 35, Arabic
Za’atari refugee camp, 40, Arabic
Za’atari refugee camp, 35, Arabic
Za’atari refugee camp, 35, Arabic
Za’atari refugee camp, 45, Arabic
Za’atari refugee camp, 40, Arabic
Za’atari refugee camp, 35, Arabic
Za’atari refugee camp, 35, Arabic
Za’atari refugee camp, 35, Arabic
Za’atari refugee camp, 50, Arabic
Za’atari refugee camp, 30, Arabic
Za’atari refugee camp, 45, Arabic
Za’atari refugee camp, 75, Arabic
Za’atari refugee camp, 30, Arabic
Za’atari refugee camp, 40, Arabic

*Female interviewee. **Safeway is one of two WFP grocery contractors operating in the camp.
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Archival data was collected from policy papers, reports, other documents from the
Jordanian government and NGOs/IGOs, documentary films, and social media related to the
camp. These data revealed the history of the camp from the perspective of the media, as well as
the social and cultural details of the refugees. Archival data also provided the triangulation of
information collected during the interviews. Using the Lexis-Nexis database, the author team
collected all local and international news articles about the camp from July 2012 to July 2016, as
well as refugee challenges in the European Union (EU) and the region of Dara’a, home to more
than 80% of the Syrian refugees in the Za’atari refugee camp. News reports and other media
provided facts, testimonies, and first-hand stories of the refugees and camp operations. These
data were valuable in providing earlier information on the camp, prior to the primary data
collected by the author team. Social media (i.e., Facebook pages and YouTube videos) created by
the refugees offered further insights into news stories and primary data from the camp.
3.3 Data analysis
Data analysis followed an iterative process. The initial coding was done in parallel with
data collection (Glaser & Strauss, 1967) and followed established guidelines offered by Gioia
and colleagues (Gioia, Corley, & Hamilton, 2013; Villena & Gioia, 2018), Glaser & Strauss
(1967), and Miles and Huberman (1994). Members of the author team independently coded the
interview transcripts collected by the lead author, and divergences were discussed until
agreement was reached among the team members.
First-order coding captured the activities in the camp and provided a contextual
understanding of how the various actor categories interacted with each other. These data—
providing information on flows of materials and allowing extensive mapping of actor activities
19

and relationships—helped construct three supply networks that captured the critical economic
activities of the refugees. Three stylized depictions (i.e., Figures 2, 3, and 4) were created for the
three networks, with nodes representing the various actor groups. Separate, descriptive coding
defined the relationships between the nodes, mapping where and how different transactions took
place throughout the history of the camp. This analysis revealed where transactions occurred,
such as inside or across the camp boundary, and in what direction (i.e., either formal or informal
transactions between nodes). The nature of transactions between refugees who occupied more
than one role (i.e., as informal retailers and buyers), both in the camp and in the host community,
were sometimes curious and not always simple or, even, obvious. For example, some
transactions required intermediaries or witnesses, while others allowed more flexible terms of
payment. As a result, data from various archival sources and follow-up communications with
camp-related actors were collected to reveal how economic and social activities in the camp were
connected to actors beyond the camp boundary (i.e., actors involved in the formal and informal
economies of the Mafraq host community).
Three key insights from the first order and descriptive coding helped uncover the
qualitative character of the relationships between actors (i.e., nodes) during specific transactions.
First, social ties—created prior to the conflict—sometimes existed between refugees and
merchants or intermediaries within Mafraq. Since tribal connections with Mafraq allowed some
of these refugees to assume specific intermediary roles, these refugees had access to resources
(i.e., through family ties) that others did not have, finding unique transaction opportunities in the
process. Second, governance for specific transactions was unique depending on the kind of
goods being exchanged. Third, representatives of the camp authority (i.e., security guards)
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routinely tolerated trafficking. In some instances, security guards were complicit with refugees
who—in the early days of the camp—transported and sold disassembled caravans across the
camp boundary at night. Recognizing these unique aspects was highly valuable when
interpreting our data. It not only led to a more critical assessment of the emergency-oriented,
formal relief operations but also compelled a refugee point of view. As a result, our analysis
accounts for the views of both refugees and outsiders (e.g., relief organizations).
Second order coding captured analytical themes, which were discussed among the
members of the author team to ascertain the constructs animating the theory. This process led to
the identification of three informal supply networks, as well as the social and economic
constructs that shaped them. These informal supply networks were realized through constructs of
refugee social capital that were associated with relational links, informal transaction governance,
and transaction legitimacy. Together, these concepts drove and accentuated distinct features of
the informal supply networks. Figure 1 summarizes the data structure.
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Figure 1. Data Structure of First-order Codes, Second-order Themes, and
Aggregate Theoretical Dimensions.
Table 2 provides illustrative data and proof quotations that inform the data structure
presented in Figure 1 (see Appendix B for a reference list of the interviewees quoted in the
study).

Table 2
Illustrative data and proof quotations.
Theoretical Dimensions,
Second-order Themes, and
First-order Categories

Illustrative Data

Configuration of supply networks through unique social capitals
Ties with linking social capital between refugees and formal intermediaries create informal transactions inside
and across the camp boundary
A. Designated community leaders are “There are community leaders for each street or area. The responsibility
given exclusive control of distributing of these leaders is to help the UNHCR and NGOs distribute donations to
housing donations.
the camp residents.” (Child Protection Officer #1, NGO-B, 2016)
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B. Designated community leaders—
positioned between donation supply
and recipient access in the camp—
engage in unlawful distribution.

“Community leaders do things like, for example, there was a donation of
3000 blankets to be distributed in the camp, but they stole most of them
and each one has taken around 15 caravans and they sold us these
donations later on.” (Temporary Worker at Community Center, NGO-A,
Refugee, 2017)

C. Designated community leaders
informally and unlawfully sell
caravans to refugees for profit.

“Some refugees got more than one caravan for his family. So, they decide
to sell the other caravan. Some of them would sell it because they need to
afford the living expenses. Also, it happened that some of them leave the
camp because they go back home or if they get a bailout guarantee to live
outside the camp. Some of them migrated to Europe or other parts of the
world, so they sell the caravans they used to live in.” (Camp Site
Supervisor, NGO-C, 2017)

Ties with bridging social capital between refugees and host community for informal transactions occur across the
camp boundary
D. Refugees assume trafficking role
to sell goods outside the camp
boundary (regular and irregular
transaction frequencies).

“In 2013, the refugees used to take some of the care packages and sell
them in Mafraq stores [...] and buy other things that they needed, so now
there is money generating in the camp and in the same time Syrian
women started making food and started selling them to the employees and
staff of NGOs.” (Supply Chain Officer, UNHCR, 2016)

E. Refugees assume trafficking role in “Some people brought some sheep during the Adha Eid to slaughter them
transactions for prohibited outside
on the first day of Eid and there were some people selling sheep here.
goods.
There are donkeys, but they are usually for carrying and transporting
goods […]; we smuggled them from the other end of the camp. A donkey
would be sold for 200 Jordanian Dinars in the camp these days [...]. By
the way, there are donkeys who are born in the camp now. So, they are
traded in the camp.” (Bedouin Refugee, 2017)
F. Tribal/family relationships aid
informal transactions between
refugees and the host community.

“Some of them were happy making the money inside of the camp and
started trading and the famous Shams Élysées started to evolve. With the
money people made, they were able to make deals with the local traders
of the city of Mafraq, outside the camp—with whom some of them they
had already business relations anyway from even before the crisis. So, the
startup money quite often came from traders from the city of Mafraq.
Even the plots for the ‘Shams Élysées’ were provided by the traders in
Mafraq. Even licenses were given by families in Mafraq.” (Camp Former
Director #1, IGO, 2017)

Ties with bonding social capital between refugees for informal transactions occur inside the camp boundary
G. Refugees encourage family and
friends to engage in informal retail
pursuits.

“I used to work in plumbing and now I have a dairy shop [in the market
street]. Once one of my friends who owns a restaurant asked me if I could
bring chicken drumsticks and I got 15 kilograms of them and they were
sold within 3 minutes.” (Dairy Products Seller, Refugee, 2016)

H. Refugees sell informally to other
refugees through informal retailers in
their local districts.

“I sell all of the credit I get from WFP, which is 160 Jordanian Dinars, to
one retailer here in the Shams Élysées Street. He gives 120 Dinars for
this. Some people sell their food shopping to these retailers at a cheaper
price as well.” (Temporary Worker at Community Center, NGO-A,
Refugee, 2017)
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I. Informal small retailers with ties to
informal large retailers—affiliated
with host community wholesalers—
get preferential buying terms.

“My shop is here in the ‘Sham Elysées’ street. It is located around 10
minutes’ walk from this retail store, so I walk every day or two to this
store to have coffee with Mr. [name of informal wholesaler] and buy the
products I need for my really small shop. [Then,] I can pay later after I
sell my stock.” (Grocery Retailer, Refugee, 2016)

Variation in conventions governing transactions
Governance for informal transactions that occur inside the camp based on cultural conventions
J. Approval to initiate informal selling “My parents pushed me to open this shop and then they started pushing
determined through family
me to get married. In a way they wanted to make me feel stable and to
connections.
help me stop thinking about going back to Syria […] No. I did not have
previous experiences in repairing and selling mobile phones […] but my
cousins in Za’atari opened mobile shops before me and it was quite a
successful business for them, so they encouraged me to open a mobile
phone shop […] I opened it next to my cousins’ mobile shops.”
(University Student, Refugee, 2017)
K. Refugee transactions for selling
businesses do not require formal
contracts.

“There are no contracts in the market inside the camp. There were cases
in which misunderstandings happen between traders, and then we
intervene to solve such disputes [...] The context [selling informally] is
illegal but [how they are conducting] transactions are legal, so we have to
intervene if a dispute happens.” (Camp Court Lawyer, Government, 2016)

L. Families enlist as witnesses and
maintain ownership knowledge for
infrequent housing transactions.

“There was no contract proving that he became my partner in the shop,
and there are no official witnesses, but my family and his family know
that he is a part owner in the shop and he became a partner in general, but
they do not know the details.” (University Student, Refugee, 2017)

Governance for informal transactions that commonly occur both inside and outside the camp based on market
conventions
M. Refugee transactions for
perishable products acquired through
formal channels in the camp.

“They [formal wholesalers] are not allowed to sell meat. They sell snacks
usually but not meat. They do not have fridges and or any good storage
conditions such as the ones in Safeway. So, they cannot have meat in
stock. We can get most of the items. But for meats including chicken and
lamb we get them from Safeway from inside the camp.” (Restaurant
Owner, Refugee, 2016)

N. Refugee transactions for packaging “We get [all packaging and disposable meal containers] from outside the
materials acquired through formal
camp. Again, we need to have the names of the items written on a letter
permissions in the camp.
and send it to the camp management and get a permission to enter the
materials.” (Restaurant Owner, Refugee, 2016)
O. Refugees buy from informal
retailers in the camp.

“Refugees in Azraq Camp [in Jordan] are forced to go to the shopping
malls [WFP Supermarkets] to buy their goods, which is very expensive,
but, here [at the Za’atari refugee camp], we have more options in the
market to buy from.” (Perfume Shop Owner, Refugee, 2016)

P. Refugees receive donations from
the NGO/IGO network and sell
conventionally.

“Bikes from some donors were also distributed at some point and some of
them [refugees] got more than necessary and then they sold them. Bikes
are a major business in Mafraq now as it is widely used in the city of
Mafraq and the camp as well.” (Supermarket Cashier, Host Community,
2018)

Legitimation of supply network boundaries
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Acquiescence and acceptance of refugee-initiated informal economy by camp authorities
Q. Camp authorities aware of regular
informal transactions.

“There are not contracts between the owners of the caravans and the users
of the caravans […]. We don’t intervene in organizing the market. We
intervene if there is a complaint by others. Although this is illegal [selling
and renting caravans], as long as there are no complaints, or this is not
making troubles for others we don’t intervene.” (Community Police
Officer #2, Government, 2016)

R. Lax monitoring of informal
retailing practices by camp
authorities.

“It is quite easy to open a shop by refugees in the camp because they do
not need to do any licensing. As long as they do not tease or annoy others
then they are free to open a small business. They do not need to get
permission from any legal entity to open a business there. They use sheds
and wood and such things. Sometimes they would pack their business
stuff and go back home, and they open again in the next day.” (Relief
Worker, NGO-D, 2016)

S. Varied enforcement of penalties by
camp authorities once goods are
inside camp.

“They [donkeys and sheep] are allowed but we cannot bring them through
the camp’s main gate. It is not allowed to bring them legally, but once we
have them inside the camp, it is ok.” (Bedouin Refugee, 2017)

The trustworthiness and validity of this study was assessed through credibility,
transferability, dependability, confirmability, and integrity (Flint, Woodruff, & Gardial, 2002;
Hirschman, 1986; Lincoln & Guba, 1985). Following Strauss and Corbin (1990), the criteria of
fit, understanding, generality, and control common to grounded studies were examined. Table 3
demonstrates that our data and analyses met these criteria.
Table 3
Trustworthiness of study and findings: Interpretative and grounded theory criteria.
Trustworthiness Criteria
Credibility: extent to which
results appear to be an
acceptable representation of
these data.

Method of Addressing Trustworthiness in this Study
•
•

Prolonged, four-year engagement in field environment with multiple data
sources.
Work presented for external feedback at three peer-reviewed organization
management/management conferences, one refugee-specific symposium,
and three university seminars.
Result: revised theoretical model benefited from feedback.

Transferability: extent to
which findings from one
study in one context apply to
other contexts.

•

Theoretical sampling used to choose unique refugee camp.
Result: conceptual model was evaluated against published reports on other
camps to ensure that key constructs were relevant across settings.
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Dependability: extent to
which findings are unique to
time and place, and
explanations are stable or
consistent.

•

Confirmability: extent to
which interpretations are the
result of participants and
phenomenon as opposed to
researcher biases.

•
•
•

Integrity: extent to which
interpretations are influenced
by misinformation from, or
evasions by, participants.

•

Facts and interpretation of events triangulated by other interviewees and
data sources (e.g., archival data, media reports, newly published research
dissertations, recent papers, and documentaries).
Result: events were consistently interpreted.
Author team involved in independent coding and data analysis.
Data analysis procedures described and recorded.
In-depth discussions with academics and practitioners with expertise in
migration, informality, and supply networks helped clarify perplexing data.
Result: coding and interpretation were refined.

•
•

Data triangulation accomplished through interviews with multiple
participants and comparison with facts reported in news and recent
dissertation.
Interviews conducted professionally with sensitivity to interview
participants.
Author team followed ethical guidelines for working with vulnerable
populations.
Result: no obvious bias from interviewees or attempts to mislead the author
team; author team was sensitive to cultural nuances during interviews,
fieldwork, data interpretation, and writing, to avoid objectifying refugees.

Fit: extent to which findings
fit with substantive areas
under investigation.

•

Understanding: extent to
which participants accept
results as possible
representation of their worlds.

•

Methods addressed credibility, dependability, and confirmability.
Result: concepts were richly described and extended; concepts provided a
convincing characterization of supply networks.

•
•

Research results presented to two NGO personnel working in refugee camps
and to an audience of migration scholars and practitioners.
Reflexivity incorporated in methodology; author team discussed
observations and insights with refugees for feedback and comments.
Peer-debriefing through presentations to scholars working in operations
management and organizational theory at three conferences and three
seminars.
Result: colleagues and researchers were brought into findings.

Generality: extent to which
findings reveal multiple
aspects of the phenomenon.

•
•

Control: extent to which
organizations influence
aspects of the theory.

•

Multiple sources of data and background data were collected and analyzed.
Interviewees include all key actor groups.
Result: multiple aspects and competing perspectives of the phenomenon were
captured.
Individuals from various actor groups could influence variables in proposed
theory.
Result: refugees were able to influence relationships and transactions within
the network; NGOs/ IGOs and host government had a strong impact on the
amount and allocation of relief support, which in turn influenced functioning
of supply networks.
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4. History of the Za’atari refugee camp
In response to a large influx of refugees at the onset of the Syrian Civil War, the Za’atari
refugee camp was established in the summer of 2012. At six kilometers from the Syrian border
and 10 kilometers from Mafraq (i.e., the host city of the camp), the Jordanian government
allotted three square miles of desert land to support Syrian refugees fleeing both sides of the
conflict. Most of the refugees arriving in Jordan were from two rural regions in mid-southern
Syria—some from Dara’a (97%) and the remaining from Homs, rural Damascus, and Hama.
Dara’a is a natural extension of northern Jordan, and both Dara’a and Mafraq are located on the
Hauran plain, where Syrians share similar cultural norms, ethnic mores, and a largely Sunni
Muslim religious background with most Jordanians (Hourani, 1991). A deep history of social
relations—in areas now occupied by Syrians and Jordanians—predates the establishment of
national borders and has been sustained through intermarriages and cross-border trade relations
(Hourani, 1991). For example, within the Za’atari refugee camp, there is a strong presence of
refugees with ties to the Al-Hariri family—an influential, patriarchal family whose ties extend
beyond the camp and whose leadership is based in Irbid, Jordan. Refugee connections with
Jordanian families, such as the Al-Hariri family, mark life in societies where clan-affiliation can
open access to resources, networks, reputation benefits, and labor or economic opportunities.
A good portion of the refugees from border regions had made a living in border trade. In
one interview, a UNHCR leader referred to these refugees as “traders and smugglers” prior to the
Syrian Civil War. For many, the camp was an opportunity to access and trade goods, as
demonstrated by some earlier, opportunistic refugees who were designated “community leaders.”
Historically, seven large family clans have been widely recognized across Syria and Jordan
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(Hourani, 1991). In many instances, clan affiliations provided a starting point for Syrian
refugees, as they could be housed by Jordanian relatives living in Mafraq. However, those
refugees from families of less means most often lived in the camp and received some form of
support from relatives living in Mafraq. Family relationships between the refugees and the
people of Mafraq also created economic linkages. The large family clans of Mafraq became
prominent wholesalers who offered loans and financial support to their relatives so that they
could start their own businesses.
Since the establishment of the camp in 2012, the Syrian Refugee Camps Directorate
(SRCD) has represented the Jordanian government in the management of security at the camp.
Daily operations were first managed by the local NGO, the Jordan Hashemite Charity
Organization for Relief and Development (JHCO), which later turned over this responsibility to
the UNHCR in 2013. Since then, the UNHCR has managed more than 20 critical local and
international NGOs (e.g., Mercy Corps, the Norwegian Refugee Council, the Agency for
Technical Cooperation and Development, OXFAM, and Save the Children) in the
implementation of its program in the camp.
Since the standard humanitarian relief approach of the UNHCR focused on formal,
sustenance-based relief operations, this left various unmet expectations or predilections for many
of the refugees. Low-quality, prepackaged meals, shared bathrooms and communal kitchens, and
supply shortages were problematic. Shortages were created by the corrupt activities of looselydesignated community leaders tasked with roles of relief supply distribution. In the first 12 to 15
months of the camp, refugees rejected some standards of relief care that was being provided by
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all camp authorities (i.e., the Jordanian government and IGOs/NGOs).3 Refugees commonly
leveraged a powerful agency, rejecting relief operation structures provided by the various
organizations. Resistance led to protests and demonstrations against relief efforts and
spontaneous challenges to the program of the UNHCR. A sizeable and outspoken contingency of
refugees—having immigrated from a mid-income economy—believed that the camp relief
supplies were inadequate, especially when comparing them to what they were accustomed to
back home. Their dissatisfaction was further aggravated by a lack of economic opportunities.
Amid the chaos of a rapid influx of refugees, the cultural expectations and—perhaps most
importantly—the sense of desperation and lack of trust for fellow refugees led to ongoing and
often violent protests.
Such a context prompted the refugees to engage in informal trading and exchanges that
led to vibrant camp marketplaces. These marketplaces quickly received attention from the media
and Western governments who touted the camp as a “success story” against the backdrop of the
unfolding refugee crisis in Europe. By the end of the data collection period in 2018, the Za’atari
refugee camp had grown to include twelve districts and a stable population of around 80,000—a
significant drop from its peak of over 200,000 in April of 2013. Between 2012 and 2018, more
than 460,000 refugees passed through the camp and were registered with the UNHCR. In 2013, it
cost $500,000 (USD) to operate the camp, with refugees consuming 4.2 million liters of water
per day and creating electricity costs of $750,000 (USD) per month (The New Humanitarian,

In some instances, we discovered that Syrian refugees were comparing themselves to Iraqi refugees who had taken
up residence in Syria at the onset of the First Gulf War. In their view, the Iraqi refugees had received better
accommodations than what the Syrians had received in Jordan.
3
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2013). In the Za’atari camp, the population had an equal gender split, with 76% of the women
responsible for childcare and home-related duties.
Since the beginning of the Syrian Civil War in 2011 to 2019, Jordan received about 1.5
million Syrian refugees. Hosting Syrian refugees had mixed implications for the Jordanian
government, including long-term stability in the region, external aid received from EU countries,
and pressures placed on housing, education, healthcare, and infrastructure. Concerns of refugees
taxing Jordanian infrastructure and competing in the labor market were particularly high in the
economically depressed region of Mafraq, which was largely oriented towards agriculture
(REACH, 2014). Such concerns made the Jordanian government wary of development-oriented
donations and relief work from IGOs and NGOs.
5. Findings
Perhaps the most daunting challenge faced by the refugees was finding relative stability
and reconstructing their lives inside the camp. Refugees began this process by engaging in
improvised, secondhand transactions, buying and selling donated relief goods among themselves
and with Mafraq residents. Relief goods were also repurposed as new production materials.
Acting in concert, refugees—with some actors from the formal relief organizations—adopted
roles of buyers, suppliers, distributors, wholesalers, retailers, traffickers, and service providers.
The formal and informal economic activities of all actors gave shape to the supply networks in
the camp.
Our analyses uncovered three theoretical dimensions, which delineated the transactions—
and their functioning—within three informal supply networks: (a) the positioning of social
capital; (b) the governance of transactions according to culturally- and market-guided
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conventions; and (c) the legitimation of informal transactions. The first dimension—drawn from
working definitions of social capital in the disaster science literature—addressed ties within the
supply networks. While bonding social capital accounted for ties that were more familiar, such as
family members, close friends, or neighbors (Woolcock, 2002), bridging social capital connected
actors to resources in parallel networks, such as other neighborhoods, clans, and social groups
(Putnam, 2000). Finally, linking social capital captured ties that were characterized by
differences in power distance, social status, or hierarchy (Szreter & Woolcock, 2004).
In section 5.1, we describe how transactions supported the three informal supply
networks: (a) building materials and housing; (b) electricity and electrical hardware (henceforth,
“electricity”); and (c) food and goods. We also highlight the network-specific relevance of the
theoretical themes with respect to the informal supply networks. In section 5.2, we describe the
three theoretical dimensions.
5.1 Three informal supply networks
We focused on building materials and housing, electricity, and food and goods for three
reasons. First, products and services associated with the three informal supply networks were
critical in meeting the basic needs of refugees and therefore had practical implications for the
daily lives of refugees. Second, formal relief operations and refugee-initiated informal operations
interacted to support the flow of resources in these networks. Finally, these networks were
representative of economic activities involving refugees.4
In Figures 2, 3, and 4, the structures of the three informal supply networks are provided

These networks differed from healthcare-related supply networks, which were fully controlled by IGOs/NGOs.
Networks for water supply and sanitary services, which bore similarities to the network for electricity and electrical
hardware, were omitted in this study for brevity and scope reasons.
4
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as stylized depictions, which identify key actor groups (i.e., nodes with three icon shapes),
specific actor roles (i.e., descriptive texts), the relative size of actor groups (i.e., three icon sizes),
the direction of material flows within transactions (i.e., arrow direction), and whether
transactions were considered formal or informal (i.e., blue denotes formal, and red denotes
informal).5 Concentric circles represent nodes of actor groups that occupy more than one role
(i.e., an informal buyer and seller). Blue-colored nodes of actor groups and material flows are
associated with formal operations in relief distribution or formal transactions within a network.
These include not only NGOs/IGOs but also local wholesalers and retailers who sell items
directly to the refugees, their informal small retail shops, and informal wholesalers in the camp.
Red-colored nodes of actor groups and material flows are associated with informal transactions.
5.1.1 The building materials and housing supply network
As depicted in Figure 2, the building materials and housing supply network was essential
for constructing the physical buildings at the camp. Together, these structures (i.e., the
marketplace and residential shelters) represented the built environment at the camp. When
incoming refugees arrived at the camp, they were given a tent from the UNHCR (i.e., obtained
through their expansive donation networks); however, housing-related donations shifted from
tents to caravans as the first winter approached. Caravans were prefabricated metal structures
with a hard floor occupying 16 square meters. During the early days of the camp, responsibilities
for distributing housing and building materials—including caravans and metal sheets for room
partitioning—were given to specific refugees who self-identified themselves as “community

5 The

stylized depictions present a variety of nodes rather than an actual number of nodes in the network. While they
demonstrate how supply chain transactions are supported by relational structural characteristics, they do not provide
a systematic evaluation of the sociometric attributes of the network (e.g., centrality and network density).
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leaders” to camp authorities. According to UNHCR personnel, these designated community
leaders were hastily recruited since it was assumed that they were respected by other refugees.
Further, recruitment was largely based on English-speaking skills, as noted by one IGO
personnel:
They are not real community leaders; they are people who come to you and
happen to speak English, so you like them already because they speak English as
foreigners. (Camp Former Director #2, IGO, 2017)
Even though they were difficult to monitor and evaluate by relief personnel, designated
community leaders had unique access to relief workers and, thus, the distribution of housing
resources. They engaged in the formal distribution of some of the resources following the
expectations of their role; however, they also informally gave or sold some of the resources
following family or kinship ties. According to one refugee:
They [the designated community leaders] started helping the relief organizations
by distributing meals. After that, they became known for [distribution on behalf
of] these organizations and they helped them by distributing caravans where they
benefit from this through getting more for themselves and their relatives.
(Temporary Worker at Community Center, NGO-A, Refugee, 2017)
By taking this step, designated community leaders created a market based on secondhand
transactions for housing and building-related materials. Some caravans—regardless of whether
they were acquired formally or informally—were disassembled and, through coordination with
other refugees, trafficked outside the camp by refugees who had connections with informal
buyers in the host community. For example, flatbed carts were created out of caravan pieces
obtained inside the camp and used car tires sourced from outside the camp. Large structures were
also transported by rolling them on felled electricity poles.
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If housing structures were sold in the camp—whether they were used as a shop or a
family dwelling, these transactions required some form of oversight. Here, governance was
supported by community elders or neighbors who enlisted as witnesses to the transaction. These
types of transactions were described by one refugee who had sold a caravan that had been
originally converted into a shop:
So, I sold it [the caravan] out and opened a small restaurant. Then, I sold it to the
shop owner next to me. There were no contracts or official witnesses. There are
no contracts in the camp [...], no official witness but traders in the market know
that the shop was sold to someone else. We do not need official witnesses.
(Restaurant Owner, Refugee, 2016)
Inside the camp, buying and selling a caravan followed cultural conventions of honor and
reputation, where an important transaction that was done in bad faith could result in that
individual being socially sanctioned or isolated. However, if a caravan was sold through an
intermediary to a buyer in the host community in Mafraq, this transaction was governed by
market conventions and required no witnesses.
In sum, the building materials and housing supply network was born out of illegal
activities that were initially pursued by the designated community leaders. On one hand,
transactions that followed family or kinship ties leveraged bonding social capital inside the
camp. To support these transactions, cultural conventions were deployed to curtail opportunistic
behavior and disputes. On the other, transactions that extended network boundaries outside the
camp were associated with bridging social capital.
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Figure 2. The Building Materials and Housing Supply Network
5.1.2 The electricity supply network
Figure 3 depicts the electricity supply network. In the planning of the camp, camp
authorities sourced electricity from a local utility company to provide power for communal paths
(i.e., streetlights) and shared facilities (e.g., community spaces, shared kitchens, and bathrooms),
as well as for the facilities of IGO/NGOs and the Jordanian government (e.g., offices, police
stations, and clinics). The original design of the camp granted refugees formal access to the
electrical grid through shared communal areas. However, once durable housing structures were
in place, an electricity supply network emerged: refugees began siphoning electricity to power
their houses and shops. Refugees with electrical skills engaged in brokerage transactions to
provide access to electricity through a market-guided, one-time fee-for-service model. Buyers of
such services included families and retailers. Several refugees and camp managers mentioned
that hostilities of refugees for camp authorities quickly abated once refugees started to power up
their caravans in late 2013:
People were organizing the theft of electricity. There were 350 electricians
working in the camp to implement this and connect electricity to shops and
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houses. I was asked every day to cut electricity because the bills UNHCR was
paying for stolen electricity were over 500,000 dollars a month, but I said ‘no’—
because electricity is light; electricity is business, electricity is safety and so on.
(Camp Former Director #1, IGO, 2017)
Beyond access to electricity through improvised and informal interfaces with the formal
supply of electricity to community spaces, individual families inside the camp also required
specific hardware, such as wiring, panels, and switches. Electrical hardware was trafficked by
some refugees across the camp boundary by leveraging bridging social capital in informal
transactions with retailers outside the camp.
The electricity supply network was the most streamlined of the three informal supply
networks, both in terms of the number of actor groups involved and the simplified nature of the
transactions. In the camp, the dyadic transactions of this network occurred according to a marketguided convention of a one-time fee-for-service model. Transactions did not require strict
monitoring or oversight. Compared to sales of caravans between families, power connection
services were governed by prearranged prices rather than through personal relationships with
electricians. Access to electricity was thus governed by market conventions of standardized
pricing and fairness.
Finally, the interface between the informal (i.e., depicted in red in Figure 3) and formal
(i.e., depicted in blue in Figure 3) portions of the network indicates that informal service
providers were critical brokers for access to electricity. This interface—and the network ties that
were created—was made possible by camp authorities (i.e., the UNHCR and the Jordanian
Government) who acquiesced and accepted the network established by the refugees. The lack of
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law enforcement afforded illegal wiring activities a measure of legitimacy, and were, therefore,
justified in the eyes of traffickers and refugee customers.
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Figure 3. The Electricity Supply Network
5.1.3 The food and goods supply network
The third and most elaborate informal supply network, food and goods, is depicted in
Figure 4. Food included both packaged and perishable food items, while goods accounted for a
variety of basic goods (e.g., phones and SIM cards, appliances, and clothing), lifestyle goods
(e.g., wedding gown rentals), and rural goods to support sustenance or economic opportunities
(e.g., goats and service donkeys) that were routinely utilized by Bedouin refugees. Inside the
camp, these goods were sourced from relief donations. From the beginning, the WFP was
contracted by the UNHCR to provide pre-packaged meal kits. Dissatisfied refugees protested the
poor quality and often flawed distribution of food rations. In early 2014, the WFP contracted
Safeway and Tazweed (i.e., the Jordanian national grocer) to open shops inside the camp. The
WFP issued vouchers so that the refugees had more opportunities to purchase what they needed,
such as specific ingredients and frozen raw meats to cook traditional meals.
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Informal transactions of food and goods originated from the resale of donated goods, as
well as exchanges that occurred between formal and informal retailers and commercial
wholesalers in Mafraq. Over time, practical needs and informal market opportunities motivated
further refugee-to-refugee and refugee-to-host community transactions. By engaging in barter
and trade transactions, these actor groups sustained and expanded the network. The government
acknowledged the positive economic spillover in Mafraq and eventually approved the relaxing of
border crossing policies by camp authorities. Informal, small retailers now received permits from
camp security officers to bring in goods through formal means, and merchants from Mafraq were
allowed to bring in goods as wholesalers. Thus, many formerly illicit economic activities
accomplished through trafficking were now considered legitimate. However, trafficking illicit
goods into the camp was not without risks; lawbreakers, if prosecuted, could be sent back to
Syria. An indication of the resilience of this network was its continued growth in size and
sophistication over time. Its success culminated in the creation of vibrant marketplaces in
different camp districts, which motivated camp authorities and the host government to continue
to ease their policies on informal buying and selling practices.
Bonding and bridging social capitals, which supported specific kinds of transactions in
the camp and across the camp boundary, contributed to the resilience of this supply network.
Bonding social capital supported informal, small retailers present in local marketplaces, and
buying and selling involved economic and social engagement with families residing in a district.
Continued interactions between informal, small retailers and informal, large retailers led to
bonding ties (e.g., a smaller retailer buying merchandise on credit). As noted by one informal,
small retailer:
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I cannot [as a small retail shop in the marketplace] buy from the same wholesale
supplier who supplies this large retailer because I cannot buy in large quantities
and, also, I cannot always pay in cash, but this retailer is one of my acquaintances
from back home and he gives me products on credit. (Grocery Retailer, Refugee,
2016)
Bridging social capital supported the flow of goods entering the camp by extending the
boundaries of the supply network beyond the camp. Conventional food and goods were brought
into the camp through 14 camp-sanctioned formal wholesalers. Bridging social capital—between
refugees who could claim a connection with Mafraq-based clans and the wholesalers connected
to those clans—was instrumental in facilitating informal access to such goods. Bridging social
capital also facilitated access to goods that were either discouraged or prohibited by camp
authorities. These transactions required traffickers to act as intermediaries between refugees—or
informal small retailers—and their connections in the host community. The deftness of
traffickers in overcoming security challenges for a variety of goods was evident. For example,
some refugees originating from a Bedouin ethnic group had been able to acquire live animals:
I know a guy who works as a street sweeper […]. [H]e is renting out his donkey
to the retailers in the market street to carry goods from the wholesaler
warehouses. There is a good use of donkeys here—especially for those who
cannot afford to establish new shops in the market. (Bedouin Refugee, 2017)
While bridging social capital helped determine the intermediaries in the network, the
actual transactions were governed by a more straightforward one-time fee-for-service/product
model. Thus, a market-guided convention—one not only free of culturally-guided obligations
(e.g., presence of witnesses) but also bringing cultural familiarity of Syrian market life to the
Jordanian camp—regulated tactical buying and selling activities. In such instances, transactions
occurred with regularity, predictability, and efficiency.
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Figure 4. The Food and Goods Supply Network
5.2 Key dimensions of refugee-initiated, informal supply networks
In this section, we describe the three theoretical dimensions, which delineate the
transactions and their functioning in the three informal supply networks: (a) legitimation of
refugee-initiated economic activities; (b) positioning of unique social capitals; and (c)
governance of transactions according to specific conventions.
5.2.1 Legitimation of refugee-initiated economic activities
Refugee-initiated transactions constituted the informal economy and exchange
relationships in the three informal supply networks. The associated economic activities were
either illegal (e.g., trafficking) or sanctioned (e.g., setting up storefronts), amidst lax enforcement
of camp rules. Interviews with UNHCR officials and locals in Mafraq revealed that many of the
camp security guards were hired locally. These guards felt that the citizens of Mafraq also
deserved access to relief supplies; goods coming from outside the region were resources that
could support the whole area, including impoverished locals hosting refugees in Mafraq. In this
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context, the cultural obligation of service to family/clan interests had economic consequences
and defined the interests and decision-making of security guards employed from the host
community. Guards also favored the interests of refugees and locals over law enforcement, since
they often came from standards of living that were at or below the level of some refugees. This
stance translated into a more permeable or flexible camp border in terms of the kinds of goods
that could cross the camp boundary. As a result, guards, as representatives of the camp authority,
did not consistently stop the trafficking of goods across the camp border and allowed informal
supply networks, as well as the traffickers inside and across the camp boundary, to be
legitimated.
The Jordanian government was aware of the level of informality in the camp but
recognized that strict monitoring and law enforcement had economic repercussions for the host
community. Over time, the government legitimated this informality by allowing businesses in
Mafraq to sell directly to informal retailers and wholesalers in the camp. Such policies not only
led to more goods and people flowing between the camp and the host city but also the
proliferation of the informal supply networks. As noted by one government official, informal
markets were acknowledged and allowed:
The way this market was formed is because some refugees felt in the beginning
that they get in-kind donations such as detergents, food items and extra blankets
from WFP and other NGOS, and they wanted to sell these extra in-kind donations
and get cash for it. So, they used to sell them outside the camp. Then, they started
to exchange it with other refugees in inside the camp. Then they opened small
random booths to sell these in-kind donations for the newcomers into the camp. It
was random. So, we could not prohibit them. [But], it is not a proper [formal]
market. (Government Official #1, Ministry of Interior, 2016)
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Refugees were also aware of leniency, as noted by one refugee who had become a university
student in Jordan:
Buying and selling caravans is obviously not allowed but no one checks on this.
The NGOs and camp management [UNHCR] know about this definitely, but they
do not care. I do not know why but [it] may be because they do not want to put
pressure on people inside the camp. I do not know. (University Student, Refugee,
2017)
Similarly, UNHCR camp authorities acquiesced and accepted a level of illegal activities
to reduce conflict in the camp. UNHCR camp authorities avoided restricting illegal transactions
and allowed relief supplies to be used for inputs in the informal supply networks. By accepting
these illegal and informal activities, the UNHCR supported the continuity and the adaptability of
the three informal supply networks. The UNHCR also recognized that such refugee activities
improved the living conditions in the camp, which further legitimated the illegal economic
activities. Overall, the government and camp authorities recognized that informality helped
sustain the livelihoods of the refugees and bring positive economic opportunities to the host
community. Table 4 presents the activities of refugees and the humanitarian relief operations of
camp authorities that led to the development and legitimation of informality occurring within the
supply networks.
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Table 4
Refugee activities leading to the development of informal supply networks and humanitarian
relief operations leading to the legitimation of informal supply networks.
Informal
Supply
Networks
Building Materials
and Housing

Humanitarian Relief Operations
Leading to the Legitimation of
Informal Supply Networks
•

•
•

The UNHCR plans camp (2011)* and
distributes donated tents (2012) and
caravans (2013) through selfidentified community leaders.
The UNHCR ceases distribution of
caravans (2015).
The UNHCR recognizes but does not
prohibit movement of families or
secondhand reselling of caravans in
the camp (2013 and following).

Refugee Activities
Leading to the Development of
Informal Supply Networks
•

•
•
•

Electricity

•

•

Food and Goods

•

•

•
•

The UNHCR purchases electricity
from local utility (2013) to distribute
to camp communal areas and NGO/
IGO facilities; arrangement continues
until solar infrastructure installation
(2016).**
The UNHCR permits siphoning of
electricity by refugees (2013 and
following).

•

The UHNCR issues standard rations
and attempts (with limited success) to
implement technologies that prevent
refugees from selling rations and
vouchers (2016)*.
The UNHCR/WFP contracts local
suppliers (2013) and allows local
wholesalers and national retailers
(e.g., Safeway and Tazweed) to
operate in the camp (2016).
The UNHCR permits development
and expansion of informal retailers
(2012 and following).
The UNHCR permits illicit goods
arriving undetected through
trafficking (2012 and following).

•

•
•

•
•
•
•
•

Self-identified community leaders are asked to
oversee the distribution of caravans, but they
give or sell some to family members or others
with preferential relationships (2013).
Refugees sell housing (i.e., tents and caravans)
for cash and traffic building materials into the
camp (2013).
Refugees dismantle caravans and customize/
repurpose materials (e.g., build shops, private
bathrooms, and kitchens) (2013-14).
Refugees move caravans closer to their extended
families (2013).
Refugees with electrical skills divert electricity to
homes and shops (2013).
Refugees traffic electrical hardware to support
marketplace growth (2013).
Refugee access to electricity allows refrigeration
in homes and shops (2013-14).

Refugees establish trade, bartering, and cash
transactions to sell UNHCR-issued rations and
vouchers inside the camp and in the host
community (2012-13).
Designated community elders collect IDs to
obtain additional goods and resell them for profit
(2013).
Refugees traffic food and goods into the camp
and open restaurants and shops offer services and
sell basic and lifestyle goods (2012).
Mafraq clans finance refugee relatives to open
businesses in the camp (2013).
Mafraq-based merchants sell goods as
wholesalers in the camp (2013).
Barber shops, wedding gown rentals, bike/phone
repair shops, restaurants, travel agencies, and
currency exchanges open in the camp (2013-14).

*Year specifies the time when operations began or when operations were prevalent.
**https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/67947

5.2.2 Positioning of unique social capitals
The relational ties that refugees established inside and outside the camp were a salient
feature in each of the three informal supply networks. Bonding, bridging, and linking social
capitals both enriched the dyadic transactions between nodes of actor groups and configured the
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informal supply networks. Thus, these three forms of social capital endowed camp refugees with
opportunities for economic exchange and access to restricted resources. Table 5 presents the
three forms of social capital conceptualized in disaster science research and represented in the
three informal supply networks of the Za’atari refugee camp (Aldrich, 2011; Holguín-Veras et
al., 2012a; Putnam, 2000; Schuller, Baron, & Field, 2000; Szreter & Woolcock, 2004; Woolcock,
2002).
Table 5
Conceptualization of social capital in disaster science research and representation in informal
supply networks.
Forms of
Social Capital
Bonding

Conceptualization in
Disaster Science Research
•
•

Bridging

•

•

Linking

•

•

Representation in
Informal Supply Networks

Connecting individuals bonded by
family, kinship, or geospatial
proximity.
Commonly existing in the same
affiliations, networks, social groups, or
organizations.

•

•

Connecting individuals of similar status •
with other distinct social groups (e.g.,
groups that have access to different
resources).
•
Commonly existing in unique
affiliations, networks, or organizations.
•

Connecting individuals of unequal
status with other distinct social groups
(e.g., groups that have access to
different resources).
Commonly existing in unique
affiliations, networks, or organizations.

Accounts for designated community leaders giving or
selling caravans to family members or others with
preferential relationships (e.g., the building materials
and housing supply network).
Accounts for informal relationships between refugees
and informal camp retailers, and between informal
small retailers and informal wholesalers (e.g., food
and goods supply network).
Accounts for mainly informal transactions between
actors outside the camp and intermediaries/traffickers
inside the camp (e.g., all three supply networks).
Accounts for infrequent transactions of informal
wholesalers with camp-sanctioned wholesalers (e.g.,
food and goods supply network).
Accounts for frequent transactions of informal
wholesalers with camp-sanctioned, formal wholesalers
(e.g., food and goods, and electricity supply
networks).

Accounts for the actions of actors at the interface between
formal actor (e.g., UNHCR) and informal actor transactions
(e.g., designated community leaders within the building
materials and housing supply network).

Bonding social capital was used by the designated community leaders when they
deliberately misallocated caravans to family members or others with preferential relationships.
These transactions led to the creation of an informal supply network in building materials and
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housing. When interacting with camp authorities in such transactions, linking social capital was
also used by intermediaries (i.e., traffickers) to gain unique and exclusive access to outside
resources donated to the camp. Thus, designated community leaders helped configure the
building materials and housing supply network as they interfaced between the formality of
donation distribution (i.e., receipt of resources from outside the camp) and the informal and
unlawful distribution of donated housing to unintended recipients inside the camp and in the host
community. Bonding social capital was also mobilized among refugees and informal retailers in
the marketplaces of each camp district, as well as between informal small retailers and informal
wholesalers who had a history of acquaintance in the camp. All these actors were instrumental in
configuring the food and goods supply network.
Bridging social capital was the only form of social capital found across all three informal
supply networks, with transactions based on historical affiliations with cross-country border
clans in Mafraq. Except for selling caravans outside the camp, the intermediaries (i.e.,
traffickers) leveraged ties to obtain resources that could only be bought beyond the boundaries of
the camp. Here, bridging social capital was used by informal, large wholesalers—who also
operated as informal retailers in the camp—to gain special access to camp-sanctioned, formal
wholesalers in the food and goods supply network. These transactions (e.g., to procure live
animals or contraband concrete mix), were discreet and less frequent. However, bridging social
capital was frequently used by traffickers who were not only the sole outgoing supply channel
for buyers outside the camp in the building materials and housing supply network but also the
sole incoming supply channel to marketplaces in the electricity supply network (e.g., for
electrical hardware).
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In sum, the three forms of social capital not only defined the boundaries of the informal
supply networks in the camp but also expanded their boundaries beyond the borders of the camp.
Bonding, bridging, and linking social capital were used by actors to constitute the three informal
supply networks, enabling efficient economic exchanges and cultivating trusting relationships.
By expanding network boundaries and creating richer relationships, the resilience of these supply
networks was supported.

5.2.3 Governance of transactions according to specific conventions
Network governance is a set of mechanisms used to monitor and control the behavior of
one entity or a group of entities to protect the interests of members associated with a network. In
this study, the three supply networks of the informal economy were all linked to the formal relief
network. The formal relief network was largely governed by explicit rules and policies and
managed through a hierarchy. The Jordanian government entrusted camp management to the
UNHCR, which in turn, coordinated the formal relief operations of other IGOs/NGOs that
worked with either donated or appropriated funds. In contrast, the three informal supply
networks were self-organized. Unlike supply networks in a peacetime context, there was neither
a single network administrator or buyer group coordinating network members nor explicit
contracts or rules governing transactions (Choi & Hong, 2002; Grandori & Soda, 1995; Pathak,
Wu, & Johnson, 2014; Pilbeam, Alvarez & Wilson, 2012; Provan & Kennis, 2008). We found
that different types of transactions in the supply networks were governed by either culturally- or
market-guided conventions (Biggart & Beamish, 2003). Table 6 summarizes these conventions
governing transactions at the Za’atari refugee camp.
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Table 6
Conventions governing transactions.
Transaction
Conventions
Culturallyguided

Conceptualization
•
•
•

Marketguided

•
•
•

Representation in Supply Networks

Transactions occur through barter, trade, or
partial trade/cash exchange.
Governance is achieved through witnesses and
mutual acquaintances to ensure fairness.
Witnesses enlisted as contract surrogates and
monitoring mechanisms (i.e., social sanctions
and reputational penalties occur when deals go
awry).

•

Transactions occur through a predetermined or
fixed fee-for-service/product.
Governance is achieved without monitoring
mechanisms.
Relational components of buying locally create
a social familiarity between buyers and sellers,
which sustains ongoing economic exchange.

•

•

•

Efficiency realized in less common transactions
and higher value exchanges inside the camp (e.g.,
informal buying and selling caravans in the
secondhand market of the building materials and
housing supply network).
Predictability built into transactions due to the
consequences of getting caught by camp
authorities (e.g., camp ejection for both
individuals).
Efficiency realized in more common transactions
and lower value exchanges both inside and
outside the camp (e.g., informal buying and
selling of electrical hardware and lifestyle goods
in the electricity and food and goods supply
networks).
Predictability based on a high frequency of
exchange between the same individuals.

The exchange relationships in the electricity supply network were the least complex of
the three. Refugees with electricity skills controlled the access to and distribution of electricity
services, with residents and shop owners paying market prices for access. Business relationships
between informal service providers (i.e., suppliers) and refugees (i.e., buyers) were based on a
one-time fee-for-service model. Once a transaction was complete, the dyadic tie became
dormant. While new electricity service demands were eventually met in the camp, such marketguided conventions still served aftermarket needs, such as electrical hardware and repairs.
The building materials and housing supply network was governed by a combination of
clan-based exchange norms and market conventions. Designated community leaders prioritized
the distribution of caravans to family members and others with preferential relationships (e.g.,
kinship ties). At the same time, caravans and building materials were also sold through a profitdriven underground market agnostic to who bought the caravans. When a family was able to
leave the camp, they sold the caravan at market price. Since selling caravans was considered
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illegal, refugees respected exchange norms to keep transactions fair and transparent, as well as to
avoid alerting camp authorities to transaction disputes or complications. In essence, this cultural
convention managed transaction risk since social sanctions or even clan ostracization could occur
if a deal went awry. Thus, designated community leaders and traffickers had disproportionate
level of power and influence in the flow of resources through the building materials and housing
supply network. For example, one refugee—after leaving the camp for an unusually long period
of time—asked a designated community leader for his old caravan upon his return. While the
request was not granted, the victim was not willing to report his grievances to camp authorities:
Well… the [designated] community leaders do things like… if you went outside
of the camp in an illegal way they would sell your caravan to someone and once
you are back you cannot complain about this because it was illegal to be out of the
camp. (Unemployed Refugee, 2016)
Compared with the other two networks, the food and goods supply network operated
according to market-guided conventions and required less oversight. A greater variety of goods
were more frequently bought and sold, which suggested a denser network with a higher number
of interacting nodes. The market was sustained by transactions and a continuous flow of
materials, which became a crucial part of the economic and social activities of the refugees.
Further, this network was more complex because family and clan-based relationships overlapped
business relationships. However, the informal transactions between buyers and sellers in the
camp, as well as those between refugees and members of the host community, were largely
governed by market conventions that were culturally understood in such settings. These
transactions mirrored those found in Syrian markets; buyers made purchases in their own
districts, and transactions were conducted with interpersonal warmth and familiarity that resulted
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in frequent and repetitive interactions. With these social features, transactions followed a marketguided, one-time fee-for-service/product model, where the incentive to keep transactions fair and
reasonable came from social incentives for continuity through repeat transactions (Biggart &
Beamish, 2003).

6. Theorizing informal supply networks
The three informal supply networks emerged and expanded in response to changes in the
supply and demand of resources in the camp. When the demand for certain products and
services, such as housing and electricity stabilized, supporting network structures and boundaries
remained but became dormant in response. However, when the demand other products, such as
food—and especially goods—increased, the corresponding supply network expanded and
increased in complexity to meet the demands of the broader network. By concentrating on three
informal supply networks, this case study presents a narrative of network resilience amid
changes within and across the camp boundary, which informs our core research question: how do
the economic activities of refugees shape humanitarian relief operations inside a refugee camp?
Employing a set of constructs that relate to informality, tie characteristics, network governance,
and network resilience, we present a theory of informal supply networks.
In this case, the three informal supply networks account for many dyadic and often
spontaneous exchanges that supported a flourishing marketplace. Each network was governed by
self-organized actors rather than by a single lead buyer or independent entity. Further, cultural
understandings guided how—and if—coordination mechanisms were required to govern
transactions (Pathak et al., 2014). For high-value transactions (e.g., building materials and
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housing), witnesses were enlisted, and for common commerce activities, market-guided
conventions were used as part of a one-time fee-for-service/product model (Biggart & Beamish,
2003). The intermediaries—or boundary spanners—resided in a communication position found
either between the informal supply networks and formal relief operations or between the camp
and the host community. As articulated by Geertz (1978, p. 31), the advantages they possessed as
a pivotal broker in this setting “stems from surrounding oneself with relatively superior
communication links” or difficult-to-access resources. Thus, intermediaries functioned as brokers
and exploited arbitrage opportunities afforded by their network positions.
While buyers, sellers, and intermediaries all sought profit and/or arbitrage opportunities,
they also selected partners for economic exchange (Khoury & Prasad, 2016) by following
cultural norms of family and kinship, leveraging both bonding and bridging forms of social
capital. Wholesaler-retailer dyads often had exclusive relationships based on previous social ties.
The prioritization of family and kinship relationships in Syrian society also influenced the
characteristics of the informal supply networks (e.g., key players and exchange relationships).
Thus, a market-guided convention for common transactions was embedded within broader social
networks of trusted exchange partners connected by bonding social capital. The informal supply
networks accommodated exchange relationships that infused both culturally- and market-guided
conventions to guide the selection of exchange partners and transactions.
The informal operations of the three supply networks were also inextricably connected to
formal relief operations through linking social capital, as the formal operations of the IGOs/
NGOs and the camp authorities interfaced with the self-organized, informal operations of the
refugees. The intermediaries (i.e., traffickers) served as a nexus through which formal relief
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resources and economic transactions within the host community were converted and channeled
into informal transactions. Some informal operations of the supply networks eventually became
an extension of formal relief operations and expanded the broad relief network to include
regional suppliers outside the camp boundary. Camp authorities also legitimated the informal
marketplaces and the development of informal supply networks by their acquiescence and
acceptance of informal activities. Had the camp authorities been able—or willing—to deter these
transactions, the informal operations of the supply networks originating in the camp would not
have prevailed, and their positive economic impact—for both refugees and the host community
—would not likely have occurred.
Whereas humanitarian relief operations fulfilled the basic survival needs of the refugees,
refugee-initiated economic activities—carried out through the informal supply networks—
supplied goods and services that supported the quality of life in the camp. These economic
activities addressed taken-for-granted human development needs, such as having familiar homecooked meals, private bathrooms and lighting, partitioned spaces for family members, and
proximate relatives. The informal operations of these supply networks met these needs not only
by providing infrastructure for material flows but also by creating the physical space necessary
for social interactions and economic exchanges. As more refugees participated in the informal
supply networks as buyers, sellers, and intermediaries, more relational ties were formed. This led
to increased tie density—particularly, in the growing food and goods supply network. Economic
transactions were infused with social ties and interactions informed by interconnections between
linking and bonding social capital. The development of relational complexity in the informal
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supply networks also marked the development of social relationships among refugees in the
camp.
The resilience of these supply networks was crucial to serving and sustaining the
economic and human development needs of the refugees. Our analysis points to stability and
adaptability dimensions of resilience. As important performance indicators (Dooley, 1997;
Holling, 1996; Novak, Wu, & Dooley, 2021), stability reflects the capability of a network to
retain a robust form, and adaptability reflects the capability to evolve and accommodate a wide
breadth of exchange relationships. In the context of a refugee camp, informal supply networks
should not only sustain basic and taken-for-granted development needs but also adapt to
changing refugee needs, shifting camp policies, and fluctuating levels of relief resources from
IGOs/NGOs. Therefore, resilience implies that informal supply networks can develop and allow
new channels to emerge and develop both inside and outside the camp.
By considering nodal characteristics, relational ties between actor groups, and underlying
social guides, we define informal supply networks as an aggregate of predominantly illicit—yet
legitimate—channels and social relationships, governed by culturally- and market-guided
conventions that support the economic exchange of goods and services between distinct actors or
actor groups.
In Figure 5, we propose a model that delineates the essential elements of an informal
supply network and specifies the theoretical relationships between the constructs.
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I nformal Supply Network Configuration
• Exchange ties formed by varied forms of social capital
(bonding, bridging, and linking)
• Governance of transactions guided by cultural and
market conventions

I nformal Supply Network Legitimation
• Integration with formal relief operations and
acquiescence/acceptance by camp authorities
• Integration with the economy of the host
community and acceptance by the
government

I nformal Supply Network Resiliency
• Stability through growth of network
actors/actor groups (nodes) and exchange
relations
• Adaptability through self-organization and
growth in relational complexity

Figure 5. Conceptual Model of an Informal Supply Network.
An informal supply network is configured through robust relational ties based on varied
types of social capital (i.e., bonding, bridging, and linking) and governance of transactions by
culturally- and market-guided conventions that open flows of relief resources from different
entities within the network. Legitimation occurs through the integration of an informal supply
network with formal relief operations both inside and outside the refugee camp, and with the
economic activities of the host community. In both cases, integration is made possible through
acquiescence and acceptance by camp authorities and by government. In turn, a legitimized
informal supply network nurtures social capital and institutionalizes the governance of exchange.
Rich ties—infused with social capital—support network resilience by stabilizing the
informal supply network and enhancing its ability to adapt to changes in the environment. The
development of transaction conventions and social capitals also reinforces network legitimation,
which in turn enhances network resilience. Integration of informal supply networks with formal
relief operations, and with the economy of the host community, will generate a positive
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economic impact both inside the camp and in the host community. This leads to a positive
feedback loop between network legitimation and network resilience.
7. Discussion
Our case study makes three important theoretical contributions. First, we propose a theory
of informal supply networks. Contributing to what Provan, Fish, & Sydow (2007, p. 509) call “a
lack of studies on the effectiveness of networks”, we delineate the key constructs that underlie a
resilient structure of informal transactions and how they shape the boundaries of a network. This
study uses the context of a refugee camp to define the operational characteristics of informal
supply networks and to reveal how these networks are able to self-organize, serve specific
functions, and interact with formal relief operations and the host community. This study also
highlights the vital roles of intermediaries who interface formal operations and expand the
boundaries of informal supply networks. With linking and bridging social capitals, intermediaries
initiate and structure the informal supply networks, connecting informal and formal networks
both inside and outside the camp.
Second, as one of the first exploratory studies of informal supply networks in a refugeecamp setting, this study contributes to studies in disaster science and humanitarian relief
operations (Holguín-Veras et al., 2012, a,b; Quarantelli, 2005). This study also broadens the
scope of considerations for supply networks in operations management research by examining
supply networks in an emergency-oriented context (Hällgren, Rouleau, & de Rond, 2018). By
examining this extreme context, we uncover the social behaviors of refugees and the social
characteristics that underlie tie formation and network structuring. These findings emphasize the
significance of investigating the social behaviors of all actors engaged in emergency-oriented
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contexts and the management of humanitarian relief operations, and thus address calls for a
better understanding of development in humanitarian relief operations (Gupta et al., 2016;
Pedraza-Martinez & Wassenhove, 2016; Sanyal, 2012; Starr & Van Wassenhove, 2014).
Finally, this study contributes to the literature that addresses informal economies
(Fadahunsi & Rosa, 2002; Williams & Shahid, 2016). While recent contributions have focused
on the character of institutions as a determinant of the extent of informal enterprise within a
locality (Webb et al., 2020), this study extends current research both empirically and
theoretically by capturing the complex and nuanced interactions of a variety of actors in informal
economic pursuits, as well as of the intermediaries who link formal and informal supply
networks. This study also reveals how the legitimacy of informality and the structuring of
informal supply networks is achieved through different forms of social capital. We uncover how
the actions of social guides—rooted in both culturally- and market-guided conventions (Biggart
& Beamish, 2003)—inform the exchange behaviors of refugees and lead to network resilience.
This study offers an alternate perspective on the productive value of the informal economy for
refugees who are not served by the state and its various contracted agents. By exposing the
impact of creating and redirecting informal supply networks to overcome difficulties imposed by
social and geospatial isolation, this study also contributes to our understanding of challenges to
agency when attempting to improve the economic livelihoods of vulnerable populations (Khoury
& Prasad, 2016).
This case study offers four practical insights for refugee camp management. First, it
dispels the notion of powerless and passive refugees; refugees are not victims awaiting charity.
The refugee camp is a society, constituted by members from every social level. Refugees have
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both agency and development needs like individuals in peacetime societies, and they leverage
social capital as a resource to rebuild a sense of cultural familiarity and normalcy as they endure
their situations (Alloush et al., 2017). Humanitarian organizations, such as IGOs and NGOs,
should recognize the unique power, resources, and social skills of refugees so that they can better
support the needs of refugees and help channel the agency of refugees towards improved
livelihoods.
Second, intermediaries are crucial in the development and functioning of an informal
supply network. Understanding the roles of intermediaries can help demystify modern
conceptualizations of the informal economy (Webb et al., 2020). In many cases, these roles
represent an important entry point for the development-oriented relief work of IGO/NGOs and
governments. Since relief organizations have the power to legitimize, they can influence the
development trajectories of agentic refugees in the creation of informal supply networks. Further,
development agencies and camp authorities should mentor and socialize intermediaries to help
integrate informal supply networks with formal relief operations coordinated through IGOs and
NGOs.
Third, the economy of refugees invariably interfaces with the economy of host
community (Taylor et al., 2016). Thus, we encourage governments to view refugees as
individuals capable of enriching their settings. Taking the view of Sendra and Sennett (2020) on
the value of designing for disorder, it is rare for a community to find ways of developing new
social networks across class and ethnic boundaries. The social and economic integration of a
camp with a host community presents a worthy experiment of productive disorder that can lead
to the development and economic empowerment of both refugee and host community
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populations. In this case study, Mafraq—an economically underdeveloped host community—
found new opportunities by integrating the refugee population. However, these new opportunities
emerged at a grassroots level, through bottom-up means between refugees and host community
residents rather than through initiatives created by the local government. The presence of cultural
symmetries between populations not only facilitated the creation of new opportunities but also
diminished the liabilities of foreignness that could have hampered economic exchange. Thus, a
host community should consider how cultural affinities (or lack thereof) impact the social and
economic integration of refugees in the regional economy. Equally important, IGOs/NGO and
government should consider the needs (e.g., infrastructure, and healthcare/education capacity)
and capabilities of the host community when deciding how to allocate resources in a developing
refugee camp economy. These actors can also remove social barriers and create incentives, such
as the use of localized sourcing and supply chains to facilitate integration.
Finally, humanitarian relief operations should become more development-oriented in
their approach to vulnerable populations. In this case study, the host community of Mafraq
clearly benefitted from the socially- and economically-resilient refugee camp of Za’atari.
Understandably, most host governments are unwilling to provide refugees anything beyond basic
sustenance needs and IGOs/NGOs must work within the boundaries set by 1951 Refugee
Convention. Further, humanitarian organizations and governments also recognize that informal
economies operate in a grey area with questionable legality and are often directly connected with
illegal underground economies where many actors are exploited without legal recourse. From the
standpoint of the host government, a more transparent and formalized refugee economy would
reduce exploitation and reduce public safety and security risks. Therefore, humanitarian
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organizations and governments should collaborate with informal supply networks and integrate
them into the formal relief system.
This study has several limitations that can inform future research opportunities. The
realization of the Za’atari refugee camp can be attributed to a host of factors, including the
hospitality of the Jordanian government, the social capital of the refugees inside and outside the
camp, the cultural affinities between Syrians and Jordanians, and the steady relief funding of the
UHNCR and other NGOs/IGOs. Few other refugee populations around the world have had
access to such social and economic resources following the forced mass displacement of a
population. Many camps (e.g., the Lesbos-based camp in Greece) accommodate diverse ethnic
groups, which would lead to different exchange relationships and network structures (Agier,
2011; Betts et al., 2017). Future studies should investigate diverse settings of informal supply
networks to capture how new exchange norms form and how informal supply networks emerge.
A deeper understanding of network resilience also accounts for adaptation, which requires
longitudinal studies that can capture not only major and meaningful change but also the effects of
change over time.
In this study, the success of the informal supply networks was related to the efficacy of
the UHNCR and its development-oriented relief work. The operations of the UHNCR have been
constrained by the 1951 Refugee Convention that mandated emergency-oriented relief missions.
As such, the UHNCR has treaded lightly between providing sustenance and addressing economic
and human development needs. This may point to the outdatedness of the Convention: it simply
does not account for large-scale refugee migration from the global south to economicallydeveloped countries (Agier, 2011). The on-going refugee challenges in Europe and the unfolding
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crisis at the southern border of the U.S. call for a more humanistic reconceptualization of refugee
resettlement—one that accounts for the human development needs of the refugees, the economic
opportunities for host communities, and, at the same time, the resources necessary to
accommodate a sudden population influx. These policy decisions will affect the operations of
IGOs/NGOs, governments, and private sector participants. Future research should continue to
explore different development-oriented strategies in refugee management, as well as the efficacy
of new strategies to create new refugee and migration policies and to change existing, and largely
failing, refugee management practices.
Finally, greater emphasis is being placed on the role of technology in humanitarian relief
operations (Fisher, 2018). Cell phones and social media have been widely adopted by refugees in
Za’atari as tools for communication with relatives in Syria, conducting business, and engaging
donors. Future research should leverage data collected from information technology to
investigate social structuring and supply network operations. However, researchers must be
aware of the challenges of protecting the identities of vulnerable populations and the potential
ethical questions associated with camp authorities implementing monitoring technologies (Jones,
2016).
In sum, our exploratory case study of the Za’atari refugee camp supports the assertion
that human settlements should be allowed to develop organically over time, with individuals and
communities granted the autonomy to freely define their own environment in the pursuit of
success (Scott, 1998). We uncovered not only how refugees could build a vibrant economy but
also how they could rebuild their society inside a refugee camp. We call upon scholars to study
similar contexts—involving refugees and the potential agency of refugees—to discover better
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ways to channel humanitarian relief, thus helping refugees to regain their dignity and realize
their potential under the circumstance of displacement.
8. Conclusion
While the stark challenges faced by Syrian refugees have elevated the plight of all
refugees in the minds of politicians and citizens across the world, these challenges have also
triggered a surge in nationalist movements and hardline policies on migration-related issues—
from deterring economic migrants to halting the entry of asylum-seekers fleeing oppressive
regimes and natural disasters (Jones, 2016). The crisis of effectively serving refugee populations
is likely to remain an ongoing challenge, against a backdrop of global pandemics, climate
catastrophes, and political extremism. At the heart of these issues are various policies for
effectively managing national borders, such as locating humanitarian relief efforts closer to the
home countries of the refugees. Our modern system of accounting for refugees—implemented
after World War II—no longer functions adequately in an age of sudden human displacements
and mass migrations. Unfortunately, policies are framed according to the view that hosting
refugees is inherently problematic (Chowdhury, 2020), where modern discourses cast refugees as
a challenge to domestic security, a threat to the demography of communities, and a drain on
social services support.
The case study of the Za’atari refugee camp underscores the real challenges of hosting
refugees. However, the Za’atari refugee camp—amidst its opportunities and obstacles—also
differs from its predecessors, offering a new approach to managing mass migration. We contend
that a development-based approach, which allows for flexible humanitarian relief policies and
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agentic refugees engaging in economic and social activities, offers a promising path forward.
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Appendix A. Interview Protocol
Focal areas for each interview, with specific questions customized during the interview and
follow-up questions added when necessary.

All Interviewees
•

Project explained, including policies for using interviewee information and for interviewees
withdrawing interview data at any time.

•

Personal background requested, including profession and personal history in Syria/Jordan.

Refugees
•

Time of arrival at the Za’atari refugee camp, the nature of the journey, and precipitating
events in home country.

•

Camp life, including settling into camp existence and day-to-day social activities.

•

Relationships, including families inside/outside the camp, clan ties, and new relationships
through marriages or friendships.

•

Economic activities (i.e., buying and selling).

•

Perception of life and existence in the camp.

•

Perception of relief agencies and camp authorities.

Residents in Mafraq Host Community
•

Connections with refugees in the Za’atari refugee camp.

•

Business activities (i.e., actual or observed) in the camp.

•

Economic and social impact of the camp on the host community.

IGOs/NGOs and the Jordanian Government
•

Overview of tasks and responsibilities, and the organization.

•

Business and operational model of the organization.

•

History, role/function, and daily work in the camp.

•

Evolution of organizational relief strategy and tasks in the Za’atari refugee camp.

•

Interactions and coordination with other actors (i.e., individuals and organizations).

•

Conflicts, competition, and challenges in working with other actors.
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Appendix B. Reference List of the Interviewees Quoted in the Study
Format for each interviewee: title, actor group, month and year, location.
•

Camp Former Director #1, IGO, September 2017, Amman

•

Camp Former Director #2, IGO, December 2017, Teleconference Call

•

Temporary Worker at Community Center, NGO-A, Refugee, November 2017, Za’atari
refugee camp

•

Restaurant Owner, Refugee, August 2016, Za’atari refugee camp

•

Grocery Retailer, Refugee, August 2016, Za’atari refugee camp

•

Bedouin Refugee, Refugee, October 2017, Za’atari refugee camp

•

Unemployed Refugee, Refugee, August 2016, Za’atari refugee camp

•

Supply Chain Officer, UNHCR, IGO, February 2016, Za’atari refugee camp

•

Camp Site Supervisor, NGO-C, NGO, October 2017, Za’atari refugee camp

•

Child Protection Officer #1, NGO-B, NGO, September 2016, Amman

•

Dairy Products Seller, Refugee, August 2016, Za’atari refugee camp

•

University Student, Refugee, October 2017, Za’atari refugee camp

•

Camp Court Lawyer, Government, August 2016, Za’atari refugee camp

•

Supermarket Cashier, Host Community, April 2018, City of Mafraq

•

Community Police Officer #2, Government, September 2016, Za’atari refugee camp

•

Government Official #1, Ministry of Interior, Government, December 2016, Amman

•

Relief Worker, NGO-D, NGO, February 2016, Amman

•

Perfume Shop Owner, Refugee, August 2016, Za’atari refugee camp
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